An upper bound is established for certain exponential sums on the rational points of an elliptic curve over a residue class ring Z N , N = pq for two distinct odd primes p and q. The result is a generalization of an estimate of exponential sums on rational point groups of elliptic curves over finite fields. The bound is applied to showing the pseudorandomness of a large family of binary sequences constructed by using elliptic curves over Z N .
Introduction
Elliptic curves over a residue class ring Z k (k composite number) were firstly employed by Lenstra [17] for factoring integers. Such curves have also been proposed for cryptography. The first public key cryptosystem on such curves was developed by Koyama et al. [15] . Since then a lot of public key schemes based on such curves have been introduced in a series of papers, see [7] , [11] , [14] , [16] , [23] and references therein. The security of these cryptosystems is based on the factorization problem for k.
For any positive integer K > 3, we identify Z K , the residue class ring modulo K, with the set {0, 1, . . . , K − 1}. An elliptic curve E defined over Z K is given by an affine Weierstrass equation of the standard form:
with coefficients A, B ∈ Z K and nonzero discriminant, see [6] . We denote by E(Z K ) the set of Z K -rational points of E including the point at infinity O. Throughout this paper, let N = pq, where p and q are two distinct odd primes satisfying "RSA type" with 2 < p < q < 2p. It is known that the set E(Z p ) of Z p -rational points of E forms an Abelian group under an appropriate composition rule denoted by ⊕ and with the point at infinity O p as the neutral element. We recall that
where #E(Z p ) is the number of Z p -rational points, including the point at infinity O p . Similarly, E(Z q ) is an Abelian group with the point at infinity O q as the neutral element. One can define an addition operation on E(Z N ) in a natural way. That is, the addition operation on E(Z N ) is the same addition on E(Z p ) except replacing all operations modulo p by operations modulo N. But unfortunately, E(Z N ) does not form a group since division is not always possible modulo N, i.e., the addition on E(Z N ) will not always be defined. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem(CRT), any x ∈ Z N can be uniquely denoted by a pair of integers [x p , x q ] with x p ∈ Z p and x q ∈ Z q . Hence, every point Q ∈ E(Z N ) can be uniquely represented by a pair of points
From the addition rule, it is easy to see
The remainder of this correspondence is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, an upper bound is established for certain exponential sums on the rational points of an elliptic curve over Z N . In Sect. 3, we describe a construction of bit generators from elliptic curves over Z N and prove that such generator can produce sequences with strong pseudorandomness. A conclusion is made in Sect. 4.
Throughout this paper, the implied constant in the symbol ' ' is absolute. We recall that the notation U V is equivalent to the assertion that the inequality |U| ≤ cV holds for some constant c > 0.
Exponential Sums on Elliptic Curves over
It is easy to see that f p (x, y) (resp. f q (x, y)) is a rational function of E over Z p (resp. Z q ). Here we present the notion of degree of f p (x, y) (and similarly of f q (x, y)), which is needed in our proof. Let R ∈ E(Z p ), where
An upper bound for certain exponential sums defined on the points of elliptic curves over finite fields has been established in [13] . For integer m > 1, let e(z) = exp(2πiz) and e m (z) = e z m .
The following statement is a special case of [13, Corollary 1].
Lemma 1:
Let f p (x, y) be a nonconstant rational function and G ∈ E(Z p ) a rational point of order t. Then the bound
holds for any α ∈ Z p \ {0} and any β ∈ Z t .
In this section, we extend the bound in Lemma 1 to the case of elliptic curves defined over
Theorem 1: With notations as above. Let f be a rational function of E over Z N such that f p and f q are nonconstant rational functions of E over Z p and Z q , respectively. For any λ ∈ Z N \{0} and β ∈ Z M , the following bound holds:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1:
With assumptions as in Theorem 1 and L ≤ M, the bound of incomplete sums holds for fixed integers a ≥ 0 and 1
Proof. See Appendix A. The proof will be based on the following basic statements on exponential sums.
Lemma 2 [21] : For any integer λ,
Lemma 3 [21] : For any integer h and 1 ≤ l ≤ m, the following bound holds
Application: Elliptic Curve Bit Generators
Recent developments point towards an attractive interest in the elliptic curve analogues of pseudo-random number generators over finite fields (abbr. EC-generators). Sequences generated from these EC-generators might possess 'good' cryptographic properties and hence provide strong potential applications, see the recent survey [22] . In particular, elliptic curves over finite fields have also been used to generate binary sequences in the last decades. To the best of our knowledge, Kaliski first applied elliptic curves to constructing binary sequences by using the elliptic curve discrete logarithm [12] . Gong, Berson and Stinson constructed a class of binary sequences by applying trace functions to elliptic curves over finite fields of characteristic 2 [8] . Goubin, Mauduit and Sárközy presented five constructions of binary sequences in [9] and conjectured that such sequences possess strong pseudorandomness, which has been proved by Xiao and the second author in [4] . Other elliptic curve binary sequences are presented in [2] , [3] , [5] , [18] .
In this section, we will apply elliptic curves over residue class ring Z N to constructing a large family of binary sequences with strong pseudorandomness in terms of the well-distribution measure and the correlation measure, introduced by Mauduit and Sárközy [19] .
For a finite binary sequence S T = {s 1 , . . . , s T } ∈ {0, 1} T , the well-distribution measure of S T is defined by
where the maximum is taken over all a, b, t ∈ N such that 1 ≤ a ≤ a + (t − 1)b ≤ T , and the correlation measure of order of S T is defined as
where the maximum is taken over all
One would expect that both measures are "small" in terms of T (in particular, both are o(T ) as T → ∞) [1] . In this case, S T can be considered as a "good" pseudorandom sequence.
From now on, we suppose that f = X or f = Y and X(G) (resp. Y(G)) denotes the X-coordinate (resp. Ycoordinate) of G for any finite rational point G ∈ E(Z N ). Since iQ is a semi-zero point if M p |i or M q |i, we suppose
Construction. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ M, we define a binary sequence S M = {s 1 , . . . , s M } of length M = M p M q as follows:
Now for any finite point iQ (except semi-zeros and O), by Eq. (2), we have
Then (3) minus (4), we get
So for any finite point iQ, we have
We will consider the well-distribution measure and the correlation measure of order 2 of S M , which is the most interesting case for pseudorandom sequences. We also need the following statements. On the other hand,
e q (2λ 1 r) .
Using Lemma 2 for the inner sums and Lemma 3, we get the desired result. The third desired result follows similarly. Now we present upper bounds on the well-distribution measure and the correlation measure of order 2 of S M . The proofs will be based on the exponential sums in Sect. 2.
Theorem 2:
Let S M be the binary sequence defined as in Eq. (2) . Then the bound of the well-distribution measure of S M holds:
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 3:
Let S M be the binary sequence defined as in Eq. (2) . Then the bound of the correlation measure of order 2 of S M holds:
Proof. See Appendix C. For estimates on the correlation measure of higher order, we would meet a complicated mathematical problem. However, it seems that the idea of [20] might be helpful.
Conclusion
We present an estimate of certain exponential sums on the points of elliptic curves over Z pq and use it to analyze the pseudorandomness of a family of binary sequences. One can construct other family binary sequences S M = {s 1 , . . . , s M } by defining
The pseudorandomness can be studied in a similar way. It would be interesting to study other cryptographic properties, such as linear complexity.
We note that in the inner sums above, we will use Lemma 2 if L ≥ M/d. Now the desired result follows by Theorem 1. (−1)
By Lemma 4 and Corollary 1, after simple calculations we have
We note that deg( 
We note that V(0) = 1. If λ 1 = λ 2 = 0, the inner sums above is at most L. It suffices to compute for k = 1 and k = 2
and T 2 := N−1 For computing T 1 , we need to consider three cases: Similarly, for computing T 2 , we need to consider three cases: gcd(λ 1 , λ 2 , N) = 1, p| gcd(λ 1 , λ 2 ) and q| gcd(λ 1 , λ 2 ) . On the other hand, we should take into account the restrictions on d 1 
